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IT is a characteristic element of that primitive interpretation of na-
ture we call animism to imagine a soul, spirit or deity within or behind
the phenomena, in order to explain their existence or function, and
thus to substitute for a real explanation a reduplication of the world.
Why is it that a tree grows and a river flows? Because there is an in-
visible dryad in the visible tree, a nymph in the river, answered the
primitive Greeks, who created the god Helois behind the sun and the
goddess Selene behind the moon, thus personifying these things. The
tendency to personify has its origin in animism. The progress of natural
science consists to a great extent in its emancipation from animism;
and if the development of social sciences still lags far behind that of
natural science it is due, among other things, to the fact that in this
field animistic and hence personifying thinking is not completely ex-
terminated. The Pure Theory of Law considers it as one of its main
tasks to free the science of law from the relics of animism, which play
a particularly dangerous role whenever jurists operate with the concept
of juristic person. If we speak in terms of "person", if we say, a juristic
person acts or a juristic person has a legal right or a legal duty, we must
always ask what is personified, and try to describe the legal phenomena
concerned in terms of legal relations among individual human beings,
that is to say in terms of human relations determined by the law.
A typical example of animistic reduplication of the object of knowl-
edge is the dualism of law and state still maintained by traditional
jurisprudence and political theory. It can hardly be denied that the
law is a social order, that is to say an order regulating the mutual be-
havior of human beings. An order is a set of rules prescribing a certain
human behavior, and that means a system of norms. The saying that
the purpose of the law is to establish order is one of the manytautol-
ogies used in jurisprudence or, what amounts to the same thing, a mis-
leading pleonasm. It produces the illusion as if there were two things,
the law on the one hand, and order on the other hand. But the law is
itself the order which those who speak of "law and order" have in mind.
Like any science, the science of law must first of all define its object
by differentiating it from other similar objects, in answering the ques-
tion: what is the law as object of a particular science? Like any science,
* A reply to Bergman, The Communal Concept of Lau, 57 YtAM L. J. 55 (1947).
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the science of law must, in defining its object, proceed from a certain
usage of language, from the usual meaning of the word by which its
object is designated. One must see whether the social phenomena
termed "law" present a characteristic in common distinguishing them
from other social phenomena, a characteristic sufficiently significant
to constitute a general concept for the rational understanding of social
life. If the Pure Theory of Law assumes that coercion is an essential
element of law, it does so because a careful examination of the social
orders termed "law" in the history of mankind shows that these social
orders, in spite of their great differences, present one common element,
an element of great importance in social life: they all prescribe coercive
acts as sanctions. In defining the concept of law as a coercive order,
that is to say as an order prescribing coercive acts as sanctions,
the Pure Theory of Law simply accepts the meaning that the term
"law" has assumed in the history of mankind.' In defining the law as
a coercive order the Pure Theory of Law conceives of the law as a spe-
cific social technique. This technique is characterized by the fact that
the social order, termed law, tries to bring about a certain behavior of
men, considered by the law-maker as desirable, by providing coercive
acts as sanctions in case of opposite behavior.
2
The definition of the concept of law as a coercive order refers to the
contents of the rules of law; it means that these rules provide for coer-
cive acts as sanctions. It does not mean that the idea men have of the
law exercises psychic coercion upon them, coerces them to conform their
behavior to the law. But it cannot be denied that a legal order is con-
sidered to be valid only if the human behavior to which this order refers
is, by and large, in conformity with the order. If this conformity-in
whatever way it may be brought about-is termed effectiveness, then
effectiveness is a condition of the validity of the law. But it is no spe-
cific element of the concept of law. No social order, not even the one
we call morality or justice, is considered to be valid if it is not to a cer-
tain extent effective, that is to say if the human behavior regulated by
the order does not at all conform to it. It is the effectiveness of a social
order that, in'the usual language, is called the power or might behind
1. Mr. Bergman raises the objection to the Pure Theory of Law that defining the con-
cept of law as a coercive order ". . is begging the question. How does one know at the
outset that what is termed 'positive law' is 'law' at all? It would be more fitting to call
such rules 'positive norms.'" But what if these norms present themselves as "law?" Mr.
Bergman refuses to call them law because he understands by law only law that is just.
Since the Pure Theory of Law does not pretend that its definition refers to just law but
only to what usually is and always was termed law, since the Pure Theory of Law is not
interested in knowing whether the law as defined by it is law in the specific sense Mr.
Bergman uses this term, there is obviously no begging of the question. See KELSEN,
GExaEAL THEoRY oF LAW & STATE 18-21 (2d printing 1946) and KISENm, LAW AND
PEA E iN ImRNATIONAL RELATIONS 3-11 (1942).
2. Kelsen, The Law as a Specific Social Technique, 9 U. OF CHr. L. REv. 75 (1941).
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the order. Why a given legal order is actually effective, why men be-
have lawfully, is difficult to say, because we have no adequate method
of ascertaining the motives of lawful behavior. Fear of the sanctions
provided by the law, especially in case the execution of the sanctions
is centralized, may play a decisive role; but it is not impossible that a
legal order, or parts of it, are effective for other reasons. Hence, effec-
tiveness as a condition of the validity of the law must not be confused
with coercion as an essential element of the concept of law.3
II
As to the relationship between law and state, it is usual to say that
the state is a political community which creates or enforces the social
order called law. This statement presupposes that state and law are
two different things, the one a community, a body of individuals, the
other an order, a system of norms. But what is a community? When
do several human beings form a community, when are they members
of a community presented as a body? A science of law, I think, is not
supposed to take these figures of speech literally. WVhat, then, is their
real meaning? The term community seems to indicate that individuals
forming a community have something in common. It is evident that
not everything individuals have in common constitutes a community.
Not all men who have dark hair in common form a community, at
least not in the sense that the state is a community. Sometimes one
assumes that a community is a community of interests, that is to say
that individuals who have interests in common form a community.
4
This is certainly not true. Common interests may be the reason for
establishing a community; but not all individuals who have interests
in common form a community; and there are communities of individ-
uals that are not at all based on a common interest of these individuals,
communities which comprise individuals of quite opposite interests.
But to present them as communities of interests is to the ideological
advantage of those in whose preponderant interest the communities
are established. Those may be a majority or a minority of the individ-
uals who form the community. To identify the concept of community
with that of a community of interests means to countenance this ideo-
logical interest. A typical example is the definition of the state as a
community based on the common interest of its subjects, or as a com-
3. Mr. Bergman rejects the view that sanction is essential to the legal norm, by the
statement that he believes that "might cannot make law." This is just the above mentioned
confusion. If he would analyze the phenomenon he calls "might," he would probably be
more cautious in his statements about the relationship between law and might. Cf. the
chapters, Psychic Compulsion and Motives of Lawfid Bchavior in Iku.sEu, GEmALa.
TrEoRY OF LAW AwD STATE (1946).
4. Thus Mr. Bergman says, "A community arises whenever two or more persons
have interests in common.!
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munity based on the common interest of its subjects, or as a community
established for the purpose of realizing the common interest of its sub-
jects. This definition evidently ignores the fact that the people of a
state is, with respect to the real interests of the individuals, not neces-
sarily a homogeneous body, that the people is almost always divided
into antagonistic groups of interest, that there is not, and there never
was, a state within which there is not a greater or smaller number of
individuals whose interests-as they rightly or wrongly understand
them-are in direct opposition to those on which this community is
established or which this community is realizing. The assertion that
the community called state is based on the common interests of its
subjects amounts to the doqtrine that this community is based on the
consent of all its members. It is the old fiction of the social contract.
It can be maintained only by the aid of the other fiction that he who
remains within the community consents to its order and thus shows that
it is in his interest. Qui tacet consentire videtur. This is one of the worst
legal fictions invented by the Roman jurists. The statement that the
state is a community based on or working for the common interests of
all its subjects, is of the same nature as the statement that Plato ad-
vocates in his Dialogue Laws: that only the just man is happy, the unjust
man unhappy. Of this statement he says that if it is a lie it is a useful lie,
for it induces the citizens to obey the law, and that means according
.to Plato, to be just. Hence the government is justified in making the
citizens believe it. I
The fact that several individuals have an interest in common does
not constitute a community any more than the fact that they have
dark hair in common. Individuals form a Community only if there
exist specific relationships among them; and a legal community exists
if these relationships are determined by the law. In an extensive study
devoted to this problem I have shown that the inter-individual rela-
tions, which constitute the community we call state are legal rela-
tions, that it is impossible to determine the unity in the plurality of
individuals we call state by a criterion independent of the social order
we call the law of the state, to define the state as a meta-juristic entity.'
As far as I can see, the arguments advanced in that study have never
been refuted. The legal character of the community called state is
particularly manifest when the state is considered in the relations
which usually are assumed to exist between this community as a politi-
cal body and the law. If we say that the state creates or enforces the
law, the state is presented as an acting person. But the state can act
only through individual human beings. When may an act, performed
by a human being, be interpreted as an act of the state? What is the
5. PLATo, LAws II, 661 ff.
6. KELSEN, DER SOZIOLOGISCHE UND JURISTISCHE STAATSBEGRXFF (2d cd. 1928).
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criterion for this imputation of the act of a visible being to the invis-
ible person of the state? The problem of the state is essentially the
problem of this imputation. The only possible answer is that an act
performed by a human being may be imputed to the state if this act
is determined by the legal order in a specific way. As long as no other
satisfactory answer to the question as to the criterion for this imputa-
tion is available, my thesis that the state as an acting person and as
subject of duties and rights is nothing but a juristic construction stands
unshaken. That the state creates the law means that human beings
in their capacity as organs of the state create the law; and that means
that they create the law in conformity with legal rules regulating the
creation of the law.7 That the state enforces the law means that a
human being acting as an organ of the state executes a sanction pro-
vided for by the law. Human beings performing acts of state are acting
as "organs of the state." That is a figure of speech meaning that their
acts are imputable to the state, and that necessarily means that these
acts are legal acts.
The human relations which, in their sum total, are called a com-
munity are always determined by an order regulating the mutual be-
havior of the individuals concerned. This social order constitutes the
community. It is this order that the individuals who belong to the
community have in common.- The social order and the community con-
stituted by it are not two different things. An individual, together with
other individuals, belongs to a community only in so far as his behavior
in relation to the other individuals is regulated by the order. To be a
member of the community means nothing else but to be subjected to
this order. To avoid the misleading appearance of a dualism of social
order and community it would be more correct to say the social order
is the community, not the social order constitutes the community.
If the state is a community, it is a legal community. As a community
it is the legal order of which we say in a not perfectly correct way that
it constitutes the community. Who could deny that the state is a social
order? And if this statement is accepted, what other order than a legal
order could the state be if---e-xpressed in the usual language-it is essen-
tial to the state to have or to establish or to enforce a legal order?
However, to say that the state as a social order is identical with the
law is not correct." Not every legal order is a state. Only a relatively
7. Mr. Bergman does not agree with the statement that the law regulates its own
creation, because he understands by law justice. The Pure Theory of Law has never
maintained that justice regulates its own creation or that the positive law regulates the
creation of justice. But that the process by which positive law is created-legislation, judi-
ciary-is regulated by positive law can hardly be denied.
S. Mr. Bergman erroneously maintains that the Pure Theory of Law identifies the
state with the law. I never maintained that the highly decentralized social orders of primi-
tive and international law constitute states.
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centralized legal order is termed a state. The personification of this
legal order is the state as an acting person. To take this figure of speech
literally, to hypostatize the personification, and then to speak of the
state as a thing different from "its" legal order, to imagine the state
as the authority, community, or power behind the law-just as Helios
was imagined behind the sun, Selene behind the moon-and to make
the state the god of the law-this is the relic of animism in jurispru-
dence and political theory, which the Pure Theory of Law tries to elim-
inate, because it leads to sham problems and empty tautologies. It
seems to be a fruitless endeavor. For, the political interest in making
the people believe in a god of the law is stronger than the interest in a
scientific analysis and correct description of the phenomena concerned.
III
The Pure Theory of Law restricts itself to a structural analysis of
positive law based on a comparative study of the social orders which
actually exist and existed in history under the name of law. Hence the
problem of the origin of the law-the law in general or a particular
legal order-meaning the causes of the coming into existence of the
law in general or of a particular legal order with its specific content,
are beyond the scope of this theory. They are problems of sociology
and history and as such require methods totally different from that of
a structural analysis of given legal orders. The methodological differ-
ence between a structural analysis of the law on the one hand, and
sociology and history of law on the other hand, is similar to that be-
tween theology and sociology or history of religion. The object of the-
ology is God, presumed to be existing; the object of sociology and his-
tory of religion is men's belief in God or in gods, whether the object of
this belief does or does not exist. The Pure Theory of Law deals with
the law as a system of valid norms created by acts of human beings. It
is a juristic approach to the problem of law. Sociology and history of
law try to describe and explain the fact that men have an idea of law,
different at different times and in different places, and the fact that
men do or do not conform tlteir behavior to these ideas. It is evident
that juristic thinking differs from sociological and historical thinking.
9. Since Mr. Bergman does not see that the law regulates its own creation, he sticks
to the usual saying, the law is the creature of the political community. Hence he defines
the law as "the means by which the political community endeavors to realize its paramount
interest in maintaining the peace and order of the area." That the law has the purpose of
maintaining peace is true, but that does not constitute an element of the definition of the
law concept. The question is by what means peace is maintained when it is maintained
by the law. If we eliminate the maintenance of peace from this definition as not essential
and if we substitute for "community" the order constituting the community, Bergman's
definition amounts to the meaningless statements: the law is the means by which the law
endeavors to realize the law.
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The "purity" of a theory of law which aims at a structural analysis of
positive legal orders consists in nothing else but in eliminating from its
sphere problems that require a method different from that appropriate
to its own specific problem. The postulate of purity is the indispensable
requirement of avoiding syncretism of methods, a postulate which tra-
ditional jurisprudence does not, or does not sufficiently, respect. Elim-
ination of a problem from the sphere of the Pure Theory of Law, of
course, does not imply the denial of the legitimacy of this problem or of
the science dealing with it. The law may be the object of different sci-
ences; the Pure Theory of Law has never claimed to be the only pos-
sible or legitimate science of law. Sociology of law and history of law
are others. They, together with the structural analysis of law, are nec-
essary for a complete understanding of the complex phenomenon of
law. To say that there cannot be a pure theory of law because a struc-
tural analysis of the law, restricting itself to its specific problem, is not
sufficient for a complete understanding of the law amounts to saying
that there can be no science of logic because a complete understanding
of the psychic phenomenon of thinking is not possible without psychol-
ogy.
10
Like the question of the origin of the law, the question of whether a
given legal order is just or unjust cannot be answered within the frame-
work and by the specific methods of a science directed at a structural
analysis of positive law. This does not necessarily imply that the ques-
tion of what is justice cannot be answered in a scientific, and that is
to say in an objective way at all. But even if it were possible to decide
objectively what is just and what unjust, as it is possible to determine
what is an acid and what a base, justice and law must be considered
as two different concepts. If the idea of justice has any function at all,
it is to be a model for making good law and a criterion for distinguish-
ing good from bad law.
There is, however, in traditional jurisprudence a terminological tend-
ency to identify law and justice, to use the term law in the sense of just
law, and to declare that a coercive order which on the whole is effective
and therefore a valid positive law, or a single norm of such a social
order, is no real or true law if it is not just. This use of the term "law"
has the effect that any positive law, or single norm of a positive law
is to be considered at first sight as just, since it presents itself as law
and is generally called law. It may be doubtful whether it deserves to be
termed law, but it has the benefit of the doubt. He who denies the
justice of such "law" and asserts that the so-called law is no "true"
law, has to prove it; and this proof is practically impossible since there
is no objective criterion of justice. Hence the real effect of the termi-
10. This is the answer to Mr. Bergman's categorical statement ... that there can-
not be a pure theory of law."
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nological identification of law and justice is an illicit justification of
any positive law.
There is not, and cannot be an objective criterion of justice because
the statement: something is just or unjust, is a judgment of value re-
ferring to an ultimate end, and these value judgments are by their very
nature subjective in character, because based on emotional elements
of our mind, on our feelings and wishes. They cannot be verified by
facts, as can statements about reality. Ultimate value judgments are
mostly acts of preference; they indicate what is better rather than what
is good; they imply the choice between two conflicting values, as for
instance the choice between freedom and security. Whether a social
system that guarantees individual freedom but no economic security
is preferable to a social system that guarantees economic security but
no individual freedom, depends on the decision whether freedom or se-
curity is the higher value. It is hardly possible to deny that there exists
a definite difference between the statement that freedom is a higher
value than security, or vice versa, and the statement that water is heav-
ier than wood. There are individuals who prefer freedom to security
because they feel happy only if they are free, and hence prefer a social
system and consider it just only if it guarantees individual freedom.
But others prefer security because they feel happy only if they are eco-
nomically secure, and hence consider a social system just only if it
guarantees economic security. Their judgments about the value of free-
dom and security and hence their idea of justice are ultimately based
on nothing but their feelings. No objective verification of their respec-
tive value judgments is possible. And since men differ very much in
their feelings, their ideas of justice are very different. This is the reason
why in spite of the attempts made by the most illustrious thinkers of
mankind to solve the problem of justice, there is not only no agreement
but the most passionate antagonism in answering the question of what
is just. Quite different is the situation with respect to statements about
reality. The statement that water is heavier than wood can be verified
by experiment, showing that the statement conforms to facts. State-
ment about facts are based, it is true, on the perception of our senses
controlled by our reason, and hence are in a certain sense subjective
too. But the perceptions of our senses are in a much higher degree
under the control of our reason than are our feelings, and as a matter
of fact nobody doubts that water is heavier than wood. Even if we
accept a philosophy of radical subjectivism and admit that the universe
exists only in the mind of man, we must nevertheless maintain the dif-
ference which exists between value judgments and statements about re-
ality. The difference may be relative only as a difference between degrees
of subjectivity ("objective" meaning the lowest possible degree of sub-
jectivity). But the relative difference is considerable enough to justify
the differentiation between a judgment about what is just and a state-
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ment about what is the law, the positive law. "Positive" law means
that a law is created by acts of human beings which take place in time
and space, in contradistinction to natural law, which is supposed to
originate in another way. Consequently, the question of what is the
positive law, the law of a certain country or the law in a concrete case,
is the question of a law-creating act which has taken place at a certain
time and within a certain space. The answer to this question does not
depend on the feelings of the answering subjects; it can be verified by
objectively ascertainable facts, whereas the question of whether a law
of a certain country or the decision of a certain court is just, depends
on the idea of justice presupposed by the answering subject, and this
idea is based on the emotional function of his mind.
11
The terminological identification of law and justice is one of the
characteristic elements of the natural-law doctrine, which presents jus-
tice under the name of "natural" law. Positive law is "law", too; and
as long as it is not proved to be at variance with natural law is to be
considered as true law. Almost all followers of the natural-law doctrine
assume, expressly or tacitly, that there exists a presumption in favor
of the conformity of positive with natural law. The historical function
of the natural-law doctrine was to preserve the authority of the positive
'law. The doctrine had, and still has, by and large, a conservative char-
acter. It is true that revolutionary movements also used this doctrine
11. That a statement about reality is based on the perception of our senses does not,
of course, mean that such a statement is true because men believe in it, as Mir. Bergman
asserts in order to prove that there is no difference between value judgments and state-
ments about reality, since both are "subjective". The statement that the sun revolves
around the earth was not true although men believed in it; men believed in it because they
erroneously thought it was true. If a statement were true because men believe in it, then
two contradictory statements were true at the same time if there were people who believed
in the one and also people who believed in the other. This would imply the abandonment
of logic. Mr. Bergman seriously maintains that "truth is what man believes:' and that
the objectivity of his belief is '". . its prevalence in the community,.. .whether the
belief concerns a physical fact or a moral evaluation." Consequently he denies the differ-
ence between belief and knowledge, which implies the denial of any difference beteen reli-
gion and science. In this respect, I am afraid, Mir. Bergman has proved too much. But in
another respect, too little. His doctrine implies that a subjective value judgment assumes
objectivity if the judging subject is a community. He speaks of "community belief," of a
community's concept or sense of justice, as if the community were the judging subject.
What is meant is that individuals belonging to the community, or the majority of those
individuals, have the same subjective value judgment. However, the fact that many indi-
viduals render the identical value judgments, cannot change the character of the judg-
ment. Mr. Bergman confuses the objectivity of a judgment with the frequency of the act
of judgment. Besides, by substituting for the individual the personified community as
judging subject, nothing is won. As there are many different communities, there are many
different "community beliefs" or community value judgments, especially many different
community judgments about what is just. In one community a socialistic, in another an
individualistic ideal of justice prevails. Then the question arises, which of these different
ideals is the right one. And to this question, Mir. Bergman's philosophy has no answer.
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to justify their demands. But the classic exponents of the natural-laAr
doctrine were by no means revolutionaries.
12
The presumption in favor of the positive law is sustained by an im-
portant consequence of the dualism of natural and positive law. The
acts of human beings by which, from the point of view of legal positiv-
ism, the law is created, such as custom, legislation, judicial decision,
consequently have a constitutive character, and which must be inter-
preted by natural-law doctrine as merely declaratory. From the point
of view of that doctrine the organs of the community do not produce
the law, they only re-produce a pre-existing law created by God, nature,
human reason, or in some other mysterious way. The organs of the
community may, it is true, fail to fulfill their task of finding the law and
formulating it in an adequate way, but it must be assumed that, on the
whole, they succeed; otherwise there would be no law realized in the
world. Besides, who could be more competent to decide what natural
law prescribes and whether the positive law conforms to the natural
law, the true law, than the organs of the community whose task it is to
find this law? To confer this competence not on the organs of the com-
munity but exclusively on the subjects supposed to obey the law, would
amount to establishing anarchy. As paradoxical as it seems, it is never-
theless a fact that the doctrine which denies that the positive law-makers
really are what they pretend to be-the creators of the law-has the
effect, if not the purpose, of strengthening their authority.
Hence the doctrine of a dual law, the true law created by a mysterious
authority, and the positive law a mere reproduction of the former, ap-
pears in many disguises. It is, for instance, the basis of Rousseau's
distinction between the "general will" (volont6 gMn~rale) and the "will
of all" (volontM de tous). The "general will" is always right, and that
means just, because it is always directed at the common interest of the
members of the community. The organs of the community, in making
law, have only to express the general will. They may or may not suc-
ceed; even a decision adopted unanimously or by the majority of the
people may fail to express the general will and hence be not binding
upon the subjects. 13 But how does the general will come into existence
if not by a unanimous or a majority vote of the people? Who is com-
petent to decide whether in a concrete case the "will of all", especially
the will of the majority, is or is not in conformity with the "general
will"? There is no answer to this question in Rousseau's classic work,
although it is just upon the answer to this question that the applicabil-
ity of his doctrine depends.
12. Kelsen, Naturrecht und Positives Recht, 2 INTERNATnoAL ZsiTscnmur iFOR
THEom DES RECHITs 71 (1927/28) ; Kelsen, Die Idee des Naturrechts, 7 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
FFENTLICHES RECHT 221 (1927).
13. RousSEAu, SOCIAL CONTRAcr, Bk. II, cc. 1-3.
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When Rousseau discusses the voting procedure, however, he states
that "the vote of the majority always binds all the rest," that "the
general will is found by counting votes," that voting for or against a
bill only means deciding whether the suggested bill is or is not "in con-
formity with the general will, each man, in giving his vote, stating his
opinion on that point." To be in the minority "proves" one to be mis-
taken about what the general will is.14 Thus the majority is always
right; the introduction of the mysterious entity "general will" and the
dualism of the "general will" and the "will of all" amount to a highly
problematical justification of a definitive form of government, to the
identification of justice with democracy.
Another form of the doctrine of dual law was presented by the Ger-
man Historical School, allegedly opposed to the natural-law doctrine.
The followers of this School started from the basic assumption that
the law, like language and religion, is essentially connected i,'ith the
specific character of a people; an assumption which is highly paradox-
ical in view of the fact that the German people was forced to give up
their own law and their own religion and to adopt the Roman law and
the Christian religion, both of which originated with totally different
peoples and in documents written in foreign languages. In spite of
these historical facts, the German School maintains that the law orig-
inates in the spirit of the people (Volksgeist), which is the real creator
of the law. Hence even customary law is not created by custom. Cus-
14. RoussEAu, op. cit. supra note 13, Bk. IV, c. 2. This is an open contradiction. In
order to attenuate this impression Rousseau does add: "... this presupposes indeed, that
all the qualities of the general will still reside in the majority. When they cease to do so,
whatever side a man may take, liberty [and that means justice] is no longer possible."
If the will of the majority is not necessarily in conformity with the general will, and a
monarch as well as a popular assembly or a parliament may issue true law, or fail in ex-
pressing the general will, how can Rousseau say that the vote of the majority "always"
binds the rest, that the general will is "found by counting votes," and that to be in the
minority "proves" one to be mistaken about what the general vill is? As a matter of fact,
Rousseau's Social Contract owes its tremendous success to the fact that it has been
understood as a justification of democracy based on the principle of majority will.
It is interesting to note that the dualism of the "general will" and the "will of all,"
of true law and positive law, is paralleled by the dualism of the true will of an individual
and his actual will. In order to maintain the fiction that an individual v.,ho voted against
the bill adopted by the majority is still free, although bound by a will that is evidently
not his own, Rousseau goes so far as to say that to be in the minority means not only to
have a false opinion about what the general will is, but also to have expressed a will which
is not one's own will, one's true will. If I vote against the majority and "if my particular
opinion had carried the day, I should have achieved the opposite of what was my will."
The true will of an individual-but not his actual will-is always in conformity with the
general will. Only the individual might not know what the general will is and consequently
what his own will is. The individual truly "wills" something that he does not know. It
is at the price of such fantastic fictions that the positive law-in this case the positive law
of democracy-is identified with justice.
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tom is not a law-creating fact; it is only evidence 16 of pre-existing law
created by the mysterious spirit. But custom is considered by the His-
torical School as absolute reliable evidence; thus customary law is
true law and as such preferred to statutory law. As to statutory law,
the most prominent representative of this school, Savigny, declared
that legislation is a rather problematical function of the state and better
omitted. He seriously tried to prove that at his time "the making of
a good code was not possible." 16 This was the time when the Code
Napoleon, that splendid product of the French Revolution, was issued.
But it was against just this Code, against the French Revolution and
its successful attempt to replace old by new law, clearly created by
legislative acts, that Savigny's theory was directed. Its political tend-
encies are unmistakable; they explain the hypothesis of an invisible
and intangible law-maker, called the "spirit of the people." The people,
Savigny says, respect much more "what has not a visible and tangible
origin" than "what has been made before our eyes by men of our own
kind." 17 Savigny tried to prove that the Roman law was customary
law. In maintaining that customary law is created by the spirit of the
people and preferable to statutory law, he tried to sustain the authority
of the Roman law, which at his time was positive law in Germany.
A similar doctrine is the doctrine of "social solidarity" (solidarit6
sociale) as the creator of true law, the "objective law" (droit objectif)
presented at the beginning of the twentieth century by the French
Sociological School, whose most prominent jurist was Leon Duguit.
According to his doctrine the legislative and judiciary organs of the
state do not create the law, but only ascertain (constatent) and enforce a
pre-existing law originating in the "social solidarity". The positive law
is binding only if it conforms to the "objective" law. The authority
called "social solidarity" is no less mysterious than the "general will"
of Rousseau and the "spirit of the people" of the German historical
school. The doctrine that positive law, in order to be binding, must
conform to the "objective law" created by the "social solidarity," is
applicable only if this doctrine furnishes an answer to the question,
who is competent to decide whether in a concrete case positive la'w is
or is not in conformity with the "objective law," the true and just law.
This is obviously the decisive question. And it is highly characteristic
that Duguit does not even discuss it. He says of the objective law orig-
inating in social solidarity that "it is the law of man as a social being
. . . man feels it or conceives of it, the scholar formulates it, the posi-
tive legislator ascertains it [constate] and secures respect for it," 18 But
15. SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN RomIscuEN Rwcums 35 (1840).
16. SAVIGNY, Von BERUF UNSRER ZEIT FOR GESETZGEBUNG UND &fITSVWISSEN-
SCHAFT 49 (3d ed. 1840).
17. Id. at 43.
18. DUGuIT, L'ETAT, LE DROIT OBJECTIF ET LA Lox PoswnvE 16 (1901).
[Vol. 57: 377
1948] LAW AND JUSTICE IN THE PURE THEORY OF LAWY 389
what is the "objective law", if one man's feeling or concept of this law
differs from that of others, if one scholar formulates it in a different
way from another, if the positive legislator ascertains as "objective la,,"'
rules which, according to the feelings or ideas of one who is supposed
to obey the positive law, are not "objective law"? It is hardly possible
that an individualist and a socialist can agree about what "social soli-
darity" requires, or what the "objective law", the true or just law, is.
Duguit ignores this problem because he simply takes for granted that
what he, from his rather individualistic point of view, considers to be
objective law is the objective law par eacellence.
As for the question who is competent to decide whether a positive
law is or is not in conformity with the "objective law," only two an-
swers are possible. The one is that it is within the exclusive com-
petence of the positive law-maker, the legislator and the judge, to
decide this question if it is disputed. If so, the positive law will always
be declared to be in conformity with the "objective law", and the dual-
ism of the two laws has the effect of a justification of the positive law
by a fictitious "objective law." The other possibility is that any in-
dividual is competent to decide the crucial question. Then the individ-
uals who are the law-making organs of the community have the same
right to decide the question as the individuals who are subjected to the
positive law. Duguit says that the positive law is imperative only if it
is the expression of the "objective law". In itself, the positive law is
not imperative, because those who issue it are human beings just as
those at whom the positive law is directed; and since human beings are
equal, no individual has any right to command others.' If so, the opin-
ion of an individual acting as legislator or judge is as good as the opinion
of an individual to whose behavior the statute or judicial decision refers.
If the legislator or judge is of the opinion that the statute or the judicial
decision issued by them is in conformity with the "objective law"-
and if they were not of this opinion they would not have issued the
statute or the judicial decision-this opinion must have the same weight
as the opinion of an individual who refuses to comply with the statute
or the judicial decision, because he thinks that they are not in conform-
ity with the "objective law." The possibility that a positive law "is"
objectively in conflict with the "objective law" is practically excluded
if there is no objective authority to decide the dispute about the issue.
What in reality exists are only contradictory opinions on what the "ob-
jective law" is. But the opinion of the governing individuals differs
from the opinion of the governed individuals in so far as the former
have the power to enforce their opinion; and their competence to en-
force a law which they think is in conformity with the "objective law"
cannot be abolished by the contrary opinion of the governed subjects,
19. Id. at 426.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
since the opinion of the governed individuals carries at least no greater
authority than the opinion of the governing individuals. Hence, the
situation which exists when not only the government but also those
subject to the government are competent to judge whether positive
law is in conformity with "objective law", is practically not very dif-
ferent from the situation which exists when this judgment is reserved
to the government. In both cases the dualism of positive and "objec-
tive law" has, just as the dualism of positive and natural law, the effect
-if not the purpose-of justifying the one by the other.2 0
These examples perhaps suffice to explain why the Pure Theory of
Law insists upon a clear separation of the concept of law from that of
justice, be it called natural, true or objective law, and why the Pure
Theory of law renounces any justification of positive Law by a kind
of super-law, leaving that problematical task to religion or social meta-
physics.
20. Mr. Bergman, too, identifies law and justice. He terms "law" only the just law
and suggests for unjust lav the term "fiat". Consequently the organs of the state, the
government, does not make law, but it may make "fiat". "Law" is created by the "articu-
late majority". But what is the "articulate majority"? If it is the majority of those who,
in accordance with the constitution, participate in the popular assembly, or the majority
of the elected members of parliament, just law would be identical with democratically cre-
ated law, and Mr. Bergman's doctrine would be a rather naive identification of justice
with democracy. But Mr. Bergman is not as naive as that. He does not define his "articu.
late majority" as the constitutional majority of a democratically organized community.
What he has to say positively of this creator of true law is only that "in any given com-
munity the population may be divided between those who articulate [through action or
through words] their thoughts and those who do not"; and that "at any given time within
a given political community the articulate majority is a precise group, but the society of
men has not yet developed measurements fine enough to locate and register this moving
force in the body politic." Mr. Bergman is quite right when he admits that the articulate
majority "is a nebulous concept at best." But although it is not possible to "locate" and
to "register" the articulate majority, this uncontrollable entity is declared by Mr. Bergman
to be "the voice of the community" and the organs of government are only "its ears". The
government has to "identify" the rules of law issued by this nebulous authority and to
"administer them". Since it is impossible to prove that a law issued by the government is
not in conformity -with that issued by the nebulous law-maker, there must be an assump-
tion in favor of the former. And that is just what Mr. Bergman expressly declares: "the
presumption of course is always that the government will follow the law which the com-
munity [meaning the "articulate majority"] has established and that, as a consequence, the
normative expression of the government will correspond to the normative expression of
the community," that is to the true law emanating from the "articulate majority". Mr.
Bergman's "articulate majority" is a very primitive, democratically dressed revival of the
solidariti sociale of the French sociological school.
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